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Is my tax office email spoofable? A free DMARC check
Criminals do not need your password to send a message that looks like it came from your firm. If your domain’s public DNS records do not tell receiving mail servers what to do with forged mail, those messages can land in a client’s inbox. This page explains SPF, DKIM, and DMARC in tax-office terms, shares aggregate findings from Florida preparer domains, and links a check that runs entirely in your browser. It is not a penetration test and not legal advice.
Check your firm domain
We only read public DNS records from your browser (Google DNS-over-HTTPS). We do not contact your servers and we do not store what you type.
Why tax offices are a target
The IRS Security Summit has repeatedly warned about impersonation of tax professionals—phishing that uses a firm’s name or a look-alike address to steal client data or redirect refunds. A WISP that never mentions email authentication is missing a basic technical safeguard. You do not need to be a bulk sender for this to matter: one convincing message to a client in March is enough.
SPF, DKIM, and DMARC are published in DNS. Anyone can look them up, which is also why you can check them without giving us access to your mail.
- SPF (a TXT record on the domain, starting with
v=spf1) lists which servers may send email for the domain. You should have exactly one SPF record. Two records is a common misconfiguration and breaks the check.+allat the end allows anyone and should be changed. - DKIM is a signature your provider (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, and others) adds to outgoing mail. Receivers look up a selector under
_domainkey. Turn it on in the admin console and publish the keys the provider gives you. - DMARC is a TXT record at
_dmarc.yourdomainstarting withv=DMARC1. The policyp=tells receivers what to do when a message fails authentication:none(monitor only),quarantine, orreject. A missing record, or a record stuck onp=none, means forged mail is still likely to be delivered. Start atp=nonewith a reporting address if you are not sure who sends mail as you, then move to quarantine and reject after you have reviewed reports—typically a few weeks, not a few years.
Formal study. The full methodology, tables by mail provider and credential, and a list of limits are in Florida tax-preparer email security, 2026.
What we found on Florida tax-preparer domains (aggregate only)
On 18 November 2026 we looked up public DNS records for domains taken from business websites listed on the Florida extract of the IRS FOIA PTIN holder list (updated 14 August 2026). After normalizing sites, dropping free and social hosts, and keeping domains that resolve and have mail servers (MX records), the mail-enabled set was 7,661 domains. We queried MX, the root TXT for SPF, and _dmarc TXT over DNS-over-HTTPS. We did not connect to any firm’s servers, send any email, or publish or keep per-firm results. No firm is named here. Limits: the sample includes only preparers who listed a website; one domain can belong to several preparers; DKIM was not measured in this aggregate; 187 domains (2%) returned lookup errors and were excluded; DMARC is one control, not a full security assessment.
| Measure | Domains | Share |
|---|---|---|
| No DMARC record at all | 4,029 | 52.6% |
DMARC in monitor-only mode (p=none) | 2,248 | 29.3% |
| Not enforcing DMARC (missing + p=none + invalid) | 6,283 | 82.1% |
| DMARC quarantine | 826 | 10.8% |
| DMARC reject | 549 | 7.2% |
| No SPF record | 734 | 9.6% |
| More than one SPF record (broken) | 112 | 1.5% |
Among those 7,661 mail-enabled domains, the share not enforcing DMARC was 75.6% for Microsoft 365 (n=2,922), 90.7% for Google Workspace (n=1,965), 87.6% for GoDaddy/Titan (n=169), and 82.4% for other providers (n=2,605). By credential listed on the PTIN record, the same “not enforcing” share was 77.6% for CPAs (n=2,500), 79.8% for enrolled agents (n=1,088), 57.0% for attorneys (n=328), and 83.2% where no credential was listed (n=4,143). These are aggregates, not a grade for any one office. Run the check above for your own domain.
A 30-minute cleanup most offices can do
- Confirm there is exactly one SPF record, with an include for your real provider (for example
include:spf.protection.outlook.comorinclude:_spf.google.com) and ending in~allor-all, not+all. - Turn on DKIM in Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace (or your host) and publish the TXT or CNAME records they display.
- Publish DMARC at
_dmarc, starting withv=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:you@yourdomain, then move toquarantineandrejectonce the reports look clean.
Copy-paste records for common hosts are included in a PreparerGuard WISP after you complete the questionnaire. The checker on this page is free and does not require a purchase. Domain Watch ($49/year) is an optional add-on that re-checks the same records daily after you have a plan.
Next step. If the check shows a gap, fix the DNS first—that work is yours or your IT provider’s. Then put the result and the remaining actions into your WISP so the plan matches the office you actually run. See the WISP / Form W-12 line 11 guide.
- Aggregate DNS review described above; source list: Florida extract of the IRS FOIA PTIN holder list (updated 14 August 2026); lookups on 18 November 2026. No firm-level results are published.
- IRS Security Summit communications on tax-professional impersonation and written security plans — irs.gov newsroom
- DMARC, SPF, and DKIM are internet standards (RFC 7489 / 7208 / 6376). Your email provider’s documentation is the practical setup guide.
- IRS Publication 5708, technical safeguards and email — p5708.pdf
Related: Versión en español · Florida email security study, 2026 · FTC Safeguards Rule checklist · Checker on the home page · Publication 4557 checklist · Data-breach reporting steps